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JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT, NEW ORIGINALISM, 
AND THE FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF 
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 
Eric J. Segall* 
“We will almost surely never again see a [Lochner era] in which the Court 
takes from liberals, as it now does from conservatives, what they win in 
the political process by, for example, striking down economic 
regulation . . . .”1 
Last year marked the fortieth anniversary of Professor Raoul Berger’s 
book Government by Judiciary, which became an originalism manifesto.2  
Berger, the son of Russian immigrants and a New Deal Democrat, criticized 
many Warren and Burger Courts’ liberal, and in his view illegitimate, 
judicial decisions.  He argued that the Justices employed the same activist 
methodology used by the U.S. Supreme Court during the so-called Lochner 
era,3 when the Justices overruled progressive economic legislation.  His 
book passionately called for judges to employ judicial restraint by focusing 
on text and original meaning, not evolving values, as the cornerstone of 
constitutional interpretation.  According to Jonathan O’Neil, the author of a 
leading book about originalism, “[m]ore than any other single scholar 
Berger highlighted the issues that separated originalism from legal 
liberalism and brought them to a wide audience.  Government by Judiciary 
attained a level of renown and influence achieved by only a handful of 
books in the history of American constitutional scholarship.”4 
Now, four decades later, a new form of originalism has emerged among 
some conservative and libertarian constitutional scholars led by professors 
Randy Barnett and Ilya Somin, litigator Clark Neily,5 and embraced by 
right-wing think tanks such as the Cato Institute and The Heritage 
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Foundation.  This influential school of thought, which often goes by the 
name “Judicial Engagement,”6 emphasizes text and original meaning as the 
essential tools of constitutional interpretation.7  However, Judicial 
Engagement scholars advocate for a completely different view of judicial 
review than the one Professor Berger thought necessary for originalist 
constitutional interpretation.  While Berger placed an enormously high 
burden of proof on plaintiffs claiming laws are inconsistent with the 
Constitution, Judicial Engagement scholars and litigators want to reverse 
that burden, requiring the government to establish in each case that the law 
at issue meets constitutional standards.8  Whereas Berger’s originalism 
minimized the judicial role in resolving social and political disputes, the 
Judicial Engagement school wants judges to aggressively police 
constitutional boundaries.9 
Whether one favors Berger’s restraint, Barnett’s and Somin’s judicial 
aggression, or some moderate theory in-between depends entirely on 
personal perspectives concerning the role of unelected, life-tenured judges 
in our constitutional democracy.  There are no right or wrong beliefs on that 
issue.  To the extent that Barnett, Somin, and others claim that originalism 
justifies their calls for judicial engagement, however, they are using a label 
that does not justify their preferred method of judicial review.  Given 
President Trump’s promise to only appoint originalist judges,10 and the 
important role the term “originalism” now plays throughout our current 
politics, this transformation—or, perhaps, misuse—of the term originalism 
is a serious matter. 
Part I briefly summarizes Berger’s originalist approach.  Part II describes 
how the new Judicial Engagement originalists suggest judges should 
resolve constitutional cases.  Part III explains why text and history do not 
support their judicially enforceable, libertarian political agendas.  Part III 
does not suggest that this agenda leads to bad results, is harmful, or should 
not be adopted by today’s judges.  But for the sake of governmental and 
academic transparency, judges, legal scholars, and politicians who embrace 
Judicial Engagement, should also accept that their theory of judicial review 
is not supported by either the Constitution’s text or history.  Judicial 
Engagement can only be justified by adopting a “living Constitution” 
approach to constitutional interpretation. 
 
 6. See Center for Judicial Engagement, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/center-for-judicial-
engagement/ [https://perma.cc/RVW4-HEHS] (last visited Apr. 27, 2018). 
 7. See Supreme Court at a Crossroads:  Judicial Engagement vs. Judicial Restraint:  
What Should Conservatives Prefer?, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/event/supreme-court-
crossroads-judicial-engagement-vs-judicial-restraint-conservatives-prefer/ [https://perma.cc/ 
F6VX-QPGQ] (last visited Apr. 27, 2018). 
 8. See, e.g., Terms of Engagement:  More Constitution, Less Government, INST. FOR 
JUST., http://ij.org/center-for-judicial-engagement/cje-research/terms-of-engagement-more-
constitution-less-government/ [https://perma.cc/YZ9X-J28Y] (last visited Apr. 27, 2018). 
 9. See id. 
 10. Ariane de Vogue, Trump’s Originalist, Neil Gorsuch, Finds His Place, CNN (Apr. 
7, 2018, 8:15 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/07/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-
one-year-anniversary/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z6NQ-TBCW] (“‘We are appointing 
judges who will interpret the Constitution as written,’ the President said.”). 
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I.  BERGER AND ORIGINALISM 
Berger’s originalist views formed at a young age.  In 1942, after he 
witnessed the end of the judicial aggression of the Lochner era,11 Berger 
criticized the recently decided Bridges v. California,12 which held that the 
First Amendment prohibits state courts from issuing contempt citations for 
out-of-court statements pertaining to a pending case absent a “clear and 
present danger.”13  Berger believed that the First Amendment’s history 
demonstrated that the Constitution did not reach such cases.  For example, 
he felt that the evidence supporting that proposition was so clear that he 
compared Bridges to what he called the inappropriate judicial review of the 
Lochner Court.14  He asked rhetorically whether 
liberals, after steadily criticizing the tendency of the [Lochner era] court 
to read laissez-faire into the Constitution, [can] afford to sanctify by their 
own example an interpretive approach which for a generation was 
employed to block social legislation and may once again be turned against 
themselves? 
 That approach, it is trite to remark, purported to give effect to 
inexorable constitutional mandates, while in fact the prejudices of the 
justices had become the Procrustean test of overdue social adjustment.15 
Thirty years later, Berger played an important role during the Watergate 
scandal arguing that there was no historical evidence supporting a 
presidential executive privilege to withhold papers and tapes relevant to 
either a criminal or congressional investigation.16  In making these 
arguments and others, Berger never wavered from his strong views that 
judicial restraint and original intent or meaning were the twin pillars of 
legitimate constitutional interpretation.  He believed that James Bradley 
Thayer’s rule of “clear mistake”—that judges should only overturn laws 
when their constitutionality was not open to “rational question”—was the 
proper stance for the judiciary.17  It is therefore not surprising that, when 
faced with the aggressive and anti-historical judicial review practiced by the 
Warren Court, Berger argued strenuously against the Court’s decisions. 
In 1977, Berger wrote Government by Judiciary.18  The book’s essential 
thesis, and one that would be repeated by many originalist scholars, such as 
 
 11. See Ian Millhiser, The Radical Ideology of this Trump Nominee Makes Even the 
Most Conservative SCOTUS Justices Uneasy, THINK PROGRESS (Oct. 10, 2017, 8:00 AM), 
https://thinkprogress.org/trumps-most-radical-nominee-since-neil-gorsuch-02d1bcabc8e0/  
[https://perma.cc/EH4M-VKSS]. 
 12. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
 13. Id. at 295–97. 
 14. Raoul Berger, Constructive Contempt:  A Post-Mortem, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 602, 604 
(1942).  
 15. Id. at 604–05. 
 16. Raoul Berger, Originalism and the Bill of Rights, Part Three - Nixon, with Berger 
and Fries, GLIBERTARIANS (Apr. 3, 2017), https://glibertarians.com/2017/04/raoul-berger-
originalism-and-the-bill-of-rights-part-three-nixon-with-berger-and-fries/ [https://perma.cc/ 
VXL9-NFD8]. 
 17. O’NEIL, supra note 4, at 114. 
 18. See generally BERGER, supra note 2. 
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Judge Robert Bork and Lino Graglia,19 was that only a theory of 
interpretation based on the “original intention[s]” of the founders could 
negate the “judicial power to revise the Constitution.”20 
Although much of Berger’s book tried to demonstrate that the Supreme 
Court’s interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment ignored and/or 
distorted the original meaning of that Amendment, he also discussed the 
broader question of how the Justices should engage in constitutional 
interpretation.21  He argued that the Justices who transformed vague 
constitutional text into open-ended repositories of rights “usurped the 
[sovereign] power” of elected institutions to make laws adapting to social 
change.22  He suggested that the founding fathers, although expecting 
judicial review, never intended the Court to go beyond the clear commands 
of the Constitution’s text and history.23 
Thirty-five years after his first law review article on the topic, Berger had 
still not given up trying to convince liberals that, if judges departed from 
text and history whenever they deemed it important enough, judicial review 
will inevitably reflect the subjective value choices of the judiciary, which at 
times may well be quite conservative.  One reviewer of his book summed 
up this argument as follows:  “If judges are not limited by some historically 
ascertainable legislative intent, they will have nothing to guide them but 
their own preferences.  This result is inconsistent with democratic values 
and frequently leads, as during the Lochner era, to substantively undesirable 
decisions.”24 
II.  JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT AND ORIGINALISM 
Professor Barnett self-identifies as an originalist.  He has written “I call 
myself an originalist (of the original public meaning variety).  Period.”25  
He has written numerous books and articles arguing that the text and history 
of the Constitution, including the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, justify not only judicial enforcement of unenumerated 
rights (in the sense that such rights are not specifically spelled out by other 
constitutional text), but also a presumption of liberty that requires the 
federal government to bear the burden of proof whenever someone claims 
 
 19. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); Lino Graglia, 
Originalism and the Constitution:  Does Originalism Always Provide The Answer?, 34 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73 (2011). 
 20. BERGER, supra note 2, at 403. 
 21. See generally id. 
 22. Gerald Lynch, Book Review, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 1091, 1091 (1978) (reviewing 
RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1977)). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 1096. 
 25. Randy Barnett, Off to a Bad Start:  Originalism and the Good Constitution, WASH. 
POST:  THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/02/23/off-to-a-bad-start-originalism-and-the-good-constitution/ 
[https://perma.cc/8ZCH-HTVH]. 
2018] FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY 51 
their freedom is abridged by a federal law.26  Rather than summarize 
Barnett’s views myself, here is an accurate description of his philosophy by 
a sympathetic New Originalist: 
Barnett seeks to impose strict limits on democratic majorities in order to 
protect individuals as sovereigns. 
 [This] theory of individual sovereignty implies strong judicial 
protection for a wide range of individual freedoms, both economic and 
non-economic . . . .  While modern judicial orthodoxy emphasizes the 
need to protect “personal” liberties such as freedom of speech and 
privacy, Barnett emphasizes that economic freedom is often just as 
important to individual liberty and just as threatened by unconstrained 
majoritarianism . . . . Barnett is right to argue that “judicial restraint,” 
often defined as deference to democratic legislatures, was a major element 
in the conservative critique of the “judicial activist” left.  But, from early 
on, many conservatives also argued for strong judicial enforcement of the 
original meaning of the Constitution, even in cases where doing so meant 
invalidating a variety of democratically enacted laws . . . . 
 The theory of individual sovereignty advanced by Barnett offers an 
alternative potential justification for originalism:  given the many liberty-
enhancing aspects of the original Constitution, as amended after the Civil 
War, adhering to the original meaning offers a greater likelihood of 
effectively protecting individual sovereignty than any other realistically 
available option.27 
How should judges enforce this strong form of judicial review?  Barnett 
has joined other New Originalists such as Professors Keith Whittington, 
Jack Balkin, and Lawrence Solum, to advocate a judicial method centered 
around the distinction between constitutional interpretation and 
constitutional construction.28  The process of interpretation involves 
ascertaining what was the semantic (non-legal) original public meaning of 
the Constitution at the time of enactment.29  This meaning does not change, 
but it may not resolve future legal claims surrounding its application.  
Constitutional construction is the process whereby legal actors, usually 
judges, apply that semantic meaning to new problems.30  In Barnett’s 
words, 
originalism is a method of constitutional interpretation that identifies the 
meaning of the text as its public meaning at the time of its enactment.  
The text of the Constitution may say a lot, but it does not say everything 
 
 26. See generally Randy E. Barnett, Foreword:  The Continuing Relevance of the 
Original Meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2017); Randy 
E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment:  It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV 1 (2006). 
 27. Ilya Somin, Book Review, 17 FED. SOC. REV. 64, 64–67 (2016) (emphasis added) 
(reviewing RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION:  SECURING THE LIBERTY 
AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (1st ed. 2016)). 
 28. See generally Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, On What Distinguishes New 
Originalism from Old:  A Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2013); Lawrence 
B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013).  
 29. See generally Richard Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 103 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 703 (2009). 
 30. Id. at 707–08.  
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one needs to know to resolve all possible cases and controversies.  
Originalism is not a theory of what to do when original meaning runs out.  
This is not a bug; it is a feature.  Were a constitution too specific, its 
original meaning probably would become outdated . . . .31 
New Originalists are candid that, at the point of construction, judges must 
employ normative judgments to resolve constitutional cases.32  Such 
judgments cannot be inconsistent with original meaning, but they will also 
not be deducible from that original meaning.33  For Barnett, and other 
scholars who believe in Judicial Engagement, constitutional construction 
should emphasize a “‘presumption of liberty’ that places the burden on the 
government to justify its restrictions on liberty as necessary and proper.”34  
This presumption applies to all cases regardless of whether the right at issue 
is or is not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, or whether the 
judges deem the right to be economic or non-economic in nature.35 
The placement of the burden of proof on the government in all cases 
implicating liberty and freedom is far removed from the originalism of 
Berger, as well as Judge Bork and other originalists writing in the 1970s 
and 1980s, who believed the Warren and early Burger Courts exercised 
illegitimate judicial review.  Yet both schools of thought claim their 
approaches are justified by the text and original meaning of the 
Constitution.  Strictly as a matter of interpretation of text and history, they 
cannot both be right. 
III.  THE ABSENCE OF TEXT AND HISTORY  
IN JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT 
Not all New Originalists agree that constitutional construction should 
embrace a strong presumption of liberty that applies to both enumerated and 
non-enumerated rights.  It is possible to adopt the interpretation-
construction framework and argue for strong judicial deference to state and 
federal laws.36  For those like Barnett, Somin, and other scholars who 
advocate for Judicial Engagement,37 however, there are major obstacles to 
their argument that judges should exercise strong judicial review. 
First, there is not a single word in the Constitution authorizing judges to 
invalidate state or federal laws, much less suggesting that the founding 
fathers expected to place upon government the burden of proving in court 
the validity of any statute that infringes liberty.  Moreover, at the time of 
the founding, no country in history had ever expressly or even implicitly 
 
 31. Randy Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 
69–70 (2011). 
 32. James E. Fleming, The Inclusiveness of the New Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
433, 436 (2013).  
 33. Barnett, supra note 31, at 70. 
 34. Id.  
 35. See generally id. 
 36. See ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM:  A 
DEBATE 152 (2011). 
 37. See, e.g., Somin, supra note 5, at 665–67. 
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granted judges that authority.  This lack of textual support suggests that 
strong judicial review was not contemplated by the founding fathers.38  
Despite this absence of textual support, however, there is substantial 
consensus among historians and legal scholars, including myself, that the 
men who wrote and ratified the Constitution expected judges to possess the 
power to invalidate laws inconsistent with the Constitution.39  For example, 
Alexander Hamilton wrote the most important pre-Constitution defense of 
judicial review in The Federalist Papers, which were a group of essays 
written by Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay to persuade the people 
of New York to adopt the new Constitution.40  In Federalist No. 78, 
Hamilton explained why judicial review was a necessary component of the 
new constitutional structure and why the power to veto laws did not make 
the judicial branch too powerful.41 
Hamilton justified judicial review by observing that the Constitution had 
become the supreme law of the new country.  It logically followed that 
no legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid.  To 
deny this, would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his principal; 
that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people 
are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of 
powers, may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what 
they forbid.42 
After arguing that legislators cannot be the judges of their own powers, 
Hamilton wrote the following important paragraph about courts and their 
responsibility to enforce the Constitution: 
[T]he courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people 
and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within 
the limits assigned to their authority.  The interpretation of the laws is the 
proper and peculiar province of the courts.  A constitution is, in fact, and 
must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law.  It therefore 
belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any 
particular act proceeding from the legislative body.  If there should 
happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has 
the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in 
other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the 
intention of the people to the intention of their agents.43 
This quotation sets forth the essential rationale for allowing judges to set 
aside laws that are inconsistent with the Constitution.  Hamilton assumes 
that the Constitution is supreme law, that the job of judges is to interpret 
 
 38. See Irving R. Kaufman, What Did the Founding Fathers Intend?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(Feb. 23, 1986), https://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/23/magazine/what-did-the-founding-
fathers-intend.html [https://perma.cc/G3FK-TL6B].  
 39. See infra notes 50–53 and accompanying text. 
 40. See The Federalist Papers, LIBR. OF CONG., http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ 
ourdocs/federalist.html [https://perma.cc/JU8K-2RQQ] (last visited Apr. 27, 2018). 
 41. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 43 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001). 
 43. Id. at 404 (emphasis added). 
54 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
that law and that, if there is an “irreconcilable variance” between a law and 
the Constitution, judges must enforce the Constitution instead of the law.44  
Hamilton also said that judges must not enforce laws that are inconsistent 
with the “manifest tenor” of the Constitution.45  The concepts of 
“irreconcilable variance” and “manifest tenor” are much more consistent 
with the idea of strong judicial deference than the New Originalists’ idea of 
strong judicial review where the government has the burden of proof 
whenever someone alleges an infringement of liberty. 
There were also a few early state and federal cases where judges 
considered striking down laws as inconsistent with either a state 
constitution or the U.S. Constitution prior to the 1803 landmark decision in 
Marbury v. Madison,46 where the Court first explicitly adopted and 
defended the doctrine of judicial review.  Many scholars—including Larry 
Kramer, Sylvia Snowiss, Gordon Wood, James Bradley Thayer, and Dean 
Michael Treanor—have reviewed these early cases.47  Although there are 
some disagreements among these academics over what these early cases say 
about the appropriate level of deference to be given to state and federal 
laws, there is a strong consensus that—outside of laws relating directly to 
judicial power or jury questions—the people of the founding era believed in 
either extremely strong judicial deference or moderate deference to other 
political decision-makers.48  There is no evidence that the founding fathers 
thought judges would exercise aggressive judicial review by placing the 
burden of proof of establishing the validity of all laws which infringe what 
Barnett calls the “Presumption of Liberty” on the government.49 
Larry Kramer, the former Dean of Stanford Law School, canvassed the 
relevant cases and concluded that judicial review was infrequently 
exercised and only exercised where the law clearly violated the 
Constitution.50  Professor Snowiss reviewed the same cases and other 
materials and argued that judges at the time thought judicial review would 
be limited to “concededly unconstitutional act[s].”51  Wood, a leading 
historian of the founding era, found that judicial review was “invoked only 
on the rare occasions of flagrant and unequivocal violations of the 
Constitution.”52  In addition, Thayer, the scholar most associated with the 
view that the Supreme Court should be highly deferential to acts of 
Congress, justified his conclusions with significant historical evidence from 
the founding period.53  Even Dean Treanor, who takes a slightly different 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 47. See infra notes 50–54 and accompanying text. 
 48. See infra notes 50–54 and accompanying text. 
 49. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 5 (2004). 
 50. See generally LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004). 
 51. SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 60 (1990). 
 52. Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall 
Court Made More out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787, 798–99 (1999). 
 53. See generally James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American 
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
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view on this subject than other scholars, concluded that people who thought 
about judicial review in the founding era believed in “general deference to a 
coequal legislature’s substantive constitutional decision making [even 
though the courts also exercised] close scrutiny of that body’s decision 
making where it affected the judiciary.”54 
Neither the text of the Constitution nor its history suggest that judges 
should play a strong or aggressive role in striking down state or federal laws 
that do not implicate the power of the courts.  Instead, the popular 
conception was that only legislative acts that clearly transcended 
constitutional limits would be null and void.55  Yet the Center for Judicial 
Engagement says the following about its vision: 
Government actions are not entitled to “deference” simply because they 
result from a political process involving elected representatives.  To the 
contrary, the Framers were acutely aware of and deeply concerned about 
the dangers of interest group politics and overweening government, and 
the structure of the Constitution rejects reflexive deference to the other 
branches. It is the courts’ job to check forbidden political impulses, not 
ratify them under the banner of majoritarian democracy.56 
As part of its statement of principles, the Center for Judicial Engagement 
also says the following: 
Just as the words in the Constitution do not change over time, neither does 
their meaning.  Though some parts of the Constitution may speak more 
precisely than others, for the Constitution to mean anything at all, judges 
must strive to understand the entire document and apply its restrictions 
and values to all situations, including new ones.  Judges’ interpretations 
and applications of the Constitution must not be influenced by their 
personal preferences—including preferences for majoritarianism or 
judicial minimalism.57 
These calls for strong judicial review of economic and non-economic 
legislation are simply not supported by text or history.  To the contrary, 
evidence from the early period indicates that the framers thought judges 
would apply either moderate or strong deference when reviewing state and 
federal laws.58  Rather than relying on judicial exercise of strong judicial 
review, the founding fathers believed that the main check on governmental 
tyranny would be the structural requirements in the Tenth Amendment 
limiting Congress’ powers to those enumerated in the Constitution and the 
 
 54. Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 561 
(2005) (emphasis added). 
 55. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text. 
 56. Declaration of the Center for Judicial Engagement, CTR. JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT, 
http://ij.org/center-for-judicial-engagement/programs/declaration-of-the-center-for-judicial-
engagement/ [https://perma.cc/3FG3-QUDZ] (last visited Apr. 27, 2018). 
 57. Principles of Judicial Engagement, CTR. JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT, http://ij.org/center-
for-judicial-engagement/programs/principles-of-judicial-engagement/ [https://perma.cc/ 
583D-N58E] (last visited Apr. 27, 2018).  
 58. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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numerous provisions in the Constitution setting forth the separation of 
powers between and among the three branches of the federal government.59 
Professor Berger believed the main purpose of the Constitution was to 
prevent tyranny and maximize individual freedom.60  But Professor Berger 
was also adamant that judges could play, at most, a limited role in 
protecting against that tyranny.61  In his words, the Constitution was: 
a text that was designed to limit and hobble the exercise of power by the 
delegates of the people.  That is the starting point from which we have to 
proceed and to evaluate what the delegates were seeking. . . .  [A] 
remarkable North Carolinian, Thomas Burke, emphasized that it was 
necessary to guard against the greediness of power.  On top of that, the 
founders had a profound distrust of judicial discretion.  Even a Tory 
judge, Thomas Hutchison of Massachusetts, said, “. . . the Judge should 
never be the Legislator . . . this tends to a State of Slavery.”  It was for 
this reason that Chancellor Kent referred to the judges’ “dangerous 
discretion . . . and [the dangers when judges] roam at large in the trackless 
field of their own imaginations.”62 
Judge Bork expressed similar views when defending his originalist 
approach to constitutional interpretation.  Judge Bork objected to judges 
closely reviewing economic legislation, because “when employed as a 
formula for the general review of all restrictions on human freedom without 
guidance from the historical Constitution, the court is cut loose from any 
external moorings and required to perform tasks that are not only beyond its 
competence, but beyond any conceivable judicial function.”63 
Professor Richard Epstein advocates for strong judicial review of 
economic legislation that is even stronger than what was exercised by the 
Court in Lochner.64  In response, Justice Scalia was aghast and responded 
that “‘our system already suffers from relatively recent constitutionalizing, 
and thus judicializing, of social judgments that ought better be left to the 
democratic process.’  He warned that a ‘reversal of a half-century of 
judicial restraint in the economic realm’ represented a ‘threat to 
constitutional democracy.’”65 
When it comes to maximizing social goods, the reluctance of old school 
originalists to approve strong judicial review of economic legislation may—
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or may not—be the best posture for today’s judges.  If the scholars and 
pundits who favor Judicial Engagement want to make that argument, we 
should listen.  But just like many of the liberal decisions of the Warren and 
early Burger Courts, as well as the same-sex marriage decisions of today, 
such strong judicial review is not supported by the Constitution’s original 
meaning. 
The difference between the aggressive liberal decisions, often criticized 
by conservatives, and the calls for Judicial Engagement by today’s 
conservative scholars is that the authors of the liberal decisions did not 
pretend that text and originalism supported their results.  Some cases, like 
Lawrence v. Texas,66 explicitly adopted an anti-originalist, living 
Constitution approach to constitutional interpretation.67  Justice Kennedy 
said that “times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see 
that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.  
As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its 
principles in their own search for greater freedom.”68 
Other cases simply ignored text and history by incorporating bare recitals 
of the text in question.  Justice Douglas’ opinion in Griswold v. 
Connecticut,69 finding a constitutional right to privacy that would later be 
used by the Court in Roe v. Wade,70 is only six pages long.  Even though 
Justice Douglas relied on six different constitutional amendments—each 
without any mention of the word “privacy”—to support his holding, he 
does not mention the original meaning of the constitutional text in the entire 
opinion.71  Furthermore, the Court’s opinion in Brandenburg v. Ohio,72 
which articulated the fundamental test for determining whether 
inflammatory speech (such as virulent racist epithets) is constitutionally 
protected, is five pages long and does not address the historical meaning of 
the First Amendment.73 
These cases can be persuasively criticized on many different grounds, but 
they cannot be criticized for a lack of transparency or honesty.  At their 
core, these cases were judicial fiats announcing fundamental values.  The 
same would be true if the Court ever adopts the Judicial Engagement model 
advocated by Barnett, Somin, and the various think tanks pushing for 
Judicial Engagement.74  Such a system of judicial review might be right, 
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wrong, desirable, or harmful but one thing is clear:  it would not be based 
on either the text or history of the original Constitution.  Instead, the theory 
of Judicial Engagement is a classic example, for better or for worse, of a 
living constitutionalism approach to constitutional interpretation.  Those 
who advocate for such a system should at least embrace, not reject, living 
constitutionalism. 
 
